OLD ALLIANCES, NEW FAULTLINES
Old alliances, new faultlines
Tanya Vatsa analyses Europe’s reaction to existing threats from Russia and the US’ ‘America First’ policy
In the intricate web of international relations, Europe’s response to Russian aggression has become a test not only of military resolve but of strategic maturity. The evolving dynamics – shaped by US President Donald Trump’s ambivalent foreign policy and his recent meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky– have exposed the widening faultlines between rhetoric and reality, alliance and autonomy.
Trump’s encounter with Zelensky, his first in months, was heavy with symbolism and devoid of substance. While the American president reiterated support for negotiated peace, his reluctance to endorse further military aid, and his veiled suggestions of pressuring Ukraine towards concessions, sent unsettling signals across Europe. Trump’s long-documented scepticism of NATO and his transactional view of global partnerships continue to erode the cohesion of the Western front. For European leaders watching closely, the message was clear: the old guarantees are evaporating.
At the centre of Europe’s recalibration stands French President Emmanuel Macron. In a notable shift from earlier caution, Macron has emerged as a proponent of what he calls ‘strategic clarity’. At a recent Paris summit, he proposed a European ‘reassurance force’– a multinational coalition tasked with aiding Ukraine to defend critical infrastructure, supporting logistics, and training Ukrainian forces. The plan, though ambitious, has exposed stark divisions within the EU. While France and the UK push for tangible deployments, others like Germany and Italy have opted for a more cautious, consultative approach.
Part of Macron’s recent assertiveness stems from an awareness that Europe can no longer outsource its security architecture. His proposal to engage in dialogue around France’s nuclear deterrent as a possible European shield – once a fringe suggestion – is gaining quiet traction among defence strategists disillusioned by the unpredictability of American commitments. It is a delicate balance: deterrence without escalation, solidarity without provocation.
But if Macron is trying to fill a vacuum, not all in Europe are on the same page. Poland and the Baltic states, acutely aware of the Russian threat, advocate a more aggressive, US-aligned posture, including expanded NATO presence and faster arms transfers to Ukraine. On the other end of the spectrum, Hungary continues to water down EU consensus, objecting to sanctions and attempting to maintain economic ties with Moscow under the guise of pragmatism.
Hungary continues to water down EU consensus
These internal tensions have stymied several coordinated efforts. Even within the European Council, talks on joint arms procurement and centralised military funding remain gridlocked over concerns around sovereignty and budgetary oversight. As the war in Ukraine drags into its third year, the limits of European consensus are becoming ever more pronounced.
Further complicating matters is the fragile energy truce recently brokered between Russia and Ukraine. With quiet backing from Washington, the two warring parties agreed not to target each other’s critical energy infrastructure for a 30-day period. Refineries, pipelines, and nuclear plants were suddenly placed under a veil of mutual restraint. Yet within days, both sides accused the other of violations. Zelensky pointed to Russian artillery strikes in Kherson; Moscow alleged drone incursions deep into Russian energy nodes. The agreement, while symbolically significant, underscores how tenuous even the most basic understandings remain in a war defined by shifting frontlines and strategic deception.
Europe must now define its own security vocabulary
In response to these growing pressures, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the ‘ReArm Europe’ initiative – a sweeping plan aimed at fortifying the continent’s defence capabilities. The proposal, which could mobilise up to €800 billion in public and private funds, emphasises domestic arms production, joint procurement, and streamlined military mobility across EU borders. It is, by all accounts, the most ambitious military-industrial program in the bloc’s history.
Yet even this initiative carries its own political risks. Smaller member states fear domination by larger economies, particularly France and Germany, in defence contracts and strategic decision-making. Others remain wary of duplicating NATO structures, potentially undermining transatlantic coordination.
Ultimately, the push for strategic autonomy, while driven by necessity, reflects deeper anxieties about the durability of the post-World War II order. Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, often guided more by domestic calculations than global coherence, has forced Europe to reckon with uncomfortable truths. The continent, long comfortable as a geopolitical appendage to American power, must now define its own security vocabulary.
The coming months will likely test both the unity and the imagination of European leaders. In the final calculus, Europe’s position is as much about deterrence as it is about identity. The continent must now navigate the twin challenges of an emboldened Russia and an unpredictable ally across the Atlantic. The path ahead will not be linear. But in this moment of fractured certainties, Europe’s resolve – cautious, contested, and yet quietly coalescing – may well be its most potent defence.
Tanya Vatsa is currently the Geopolitical and Predictive Intelligence specialist at Inquest Advisories in India, as well as Editor at the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Dept of Defence, United States of America. She completed her Master’s in Legal Studies at the University of Edinburgh after obtaining a law degree from Lucknow’s National Law University, India