EDITORIAL – OCT 2024 – NATO’s Indo-Pacific conundrum
Dancing with many partners
Former Netherlands’ prime minister Mark Rutte takes the helm of the world’s most formidable military alliance this month with a pivotal question under the spotlight.
What, if any, is NATO’s responsibility towards the Indo-Pacific? And, once that is determined, what should be done about it?
As its very name suggests, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance was set up in 1949 to counter threats to North America and Europe which were clear and present during the Cold War and have emerged again with Russia’s aggressive attempt at enlargement.
Two decades earlier, when Islamic terror was seen as the priority threat, NATO expanded its boundaries outside Europe into post-9/11Afghanistan.
For 18 years this American initiative attempted to end conflict and stabilise Afghanistan. Butit dramatically failed.
In 2022, a year after Kabul fell, NATO officially identified China as a security challenge, intensifying the debate about how closely NATO and the Indo-Pacific should work together.
The outgoing secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, madeno secret of his concern about NATO and rising global threats, saying,‘Europe’s security affects Asia, and Asia’s security affects Europe…Everything is intertwined and, therefore, we need to address these challenges together.’
Washington is keen to promote closer alignment. America’s closest treaty partners such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand take the stage at NATO summits. Meanwhile, China accuses the US of trying to build an Indo-Pacific version of NATO.
And herein lies the rub.
While the NATO idea might suit European mindsets, it sits uneasily within Asia, where values and red lines are more loosely drawn. Increasing NATO’s Asian involvement may risk weakening rather than enhancing security.
Existing flashpoints such as the Philippines’ Scarborough Shoal or the Taiwan Strait could escalate as China tests resolve and American allies are emboldened.
Such escalation strains the existing security umbrella towards hot conflict, on which America’s track record is not good.
In the 1960s, for example, Washington believed that a series of graduated airstrikes would persuade North Vietnam to back down. It did not.
America lost that war, just as it lost Afghanistan – by failing to read the steely determination within local cultures.
There is also the question of membership.
NATO’s founding principles state that members must adhere to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Therefore, either those rules change or strategic allies such as Singapore, Thailand and Brunei would have to be excluded.
But, if not NATO or something similar, what should the region put in place to fill the growing security vacuum?
Such thinking needs to be addressed on at least three levels: The strategic balance between nations; the erosion of nuclear weapons agreements; and the rise of non-state actors which are bedevilling the Middle East.
First, strategic balance.
Of the 50-odd nations of the Indo-Pacific, only four –Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – are locked inside the American camp. Taiwan, which, technically, is not a nation, relies on US protection. Others have looser arrangements.
Washington is trying to coax India into a closer partnership while, paradoxically, Prime Minister Modi is leading the trend for multi-polar alliances, where a nation can buy oil and weapons from Russia while making vaccines and phones for America.
Asia’s idea of strategic balance, therefore, is incomparable to Europe’s or North America’s.
As defence spending rises, deepening concern revolves around nuclear weapons.
The challenge comes not only from autocratic China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, but also from allies preparing for a weakening of American security.
More that 70 percent of South Koreans now support their country becoming a nuclear-weapons state. Taiwan and Japan also have skills to quickly build weapons.
The Indo-Pacific has six contiguous nuclear weapon states – China, India, North Korea Pakistan, Russia, and the US.
Current norms governing nuclear weapons have prevented their use since 1945. New rules are needed, and the conversation should begin now.
On non-state actors, Asia has a far better record than the Middle East and North Africa.
As he steps into his new job, Mark Rutte’s focus is on Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, warring factions in Libya, Sudan and the disintegrating Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa.
Similar Islamic and separatist trends flow through Asia. But its systems seem to be robust and flexible enough to handle them in a way that does not threaten government itself. In this respect, Asia has lessons to teach the West, should it be willing to listen.
The concepts of mutual protection and deterrence predominate NATO’s argument.
The question for Asia must be how that system would work. Is there enough unity to guarantee protection, and where does the balance lie between deterrence and provocation?