February 2025

MIRED IN COMPLEXITY

Mired in complexity

In its latest panel debate, The Democracy Forum attempted to unravel the various factors underpinning Pakistan’s multi-layered crisis

Pakistan’s ruling establishment remains too wedded to the idea of India as a permanent enemy, resulting in a ‘Kashmir-first policy’. This was among the views posited by panellists at TDF’s first debate of the year, ‘Understanding Pakistan’s multifaceted crisis’.

Clearly, said TDF President Lord Bruce in his introduction, this is a crisis which has reached boiling point, but which remains mired in complexity and contradiction. At its heart lies the perennial in stability of the political process, with Pakistan having been ruled for almost 80 years by at least five different types of hybrid democracy, all subject to some degree of military interference, including direct military rule, military-bureaucratic oligarchy, rule by military government under a civilian president, and constant military pressure, which has been the fate of atleast two elected governments. None of the country’s 31 elected prime ministers has served a full term. The Pakistan economy is stymied by unsustainable growth, added Lord Bruce, and the tendency to succumb too easily to boom and bust cycles – a predicament unlikely to change until Pakistan increases exports and boost tax collection enough to fund badly needed government investment. While the country’s unstable public finances have been reprieved by a $7bn funding programme which the IMF offered in July last year–the 24th such bailout – with interest payments already absorbing over 60% of government revenues, PM Shehbaz Sharif has been forced to implement a draconian budget effectively increasing taxation by 40%.

pak crisis
Pic of webinar panellists

Pakistan’s over-reliance on FDI, particularly from China, is another source of concern, said Lord Bruce. Since the inception of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) in 2015, Pakistan has benefitted from investment derived from the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises in the region of $65bn. Consequently it now owes 72% of its external bilateral debt to China, amounting to $26 bn, and the cost of rolling over the debt is clearly unsustainable. For all the expectations, CPEC has not delivered sustainable economic growth for Pakistan, and it is unclear how China intends to perpetuate this co-dependency relationship, But it is the diplomatic froideur with India which remains Pakistan’s greatest unresolved and incipient crisis, warned Lord Bruce, and it is difficult to understand how a reconciliation may occur. Indeed It has taken the October visit of India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, to Islamabad for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – the first such visit in nine years –to stimulate an outpouring of wishful thinking, former PM Nawaz Sharif suggesting Jaishankar’s visit was a ‘good opportunity’, and hoping it would be possible to take a fresh approach towards resetting the bilateral relationship. Lord Bruce concluded by wondering if any of the panellists shared this optimism.

Pakistan’s over-reliance on FDI, particularly from China, is another source of concern

Considering Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis its South Asian neighbours, especially India, was Dr Aparna Pande, Research Fellow and Director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, Hudson Institute. Every country’s most important relationships are with its immediate neighbours, she began, as positive relations with neighbours help on economic and security fronts, and ensure domestic stability. Unfortunately, Pakistan has rarely enjoyed good relations with any of its immediate neighbours, either to the east or west, and its ties with India have always been particularly friction-ridden. Since independence, Pakistan’s policies have always been framed around ‘not being India’. This mistrust towards India, and insecurity around Inda’s larger size, and intentions, have led its security establishment and strategists to argue that India never accepted the creation of Pakistan and seeks to undo Partition. (If this was the case, she later argued, why did India withdraw its troops from then East Pakistan in 1971?) This has allowed issues such as Kashmir to remain at the forefront, and place focus on India being an existential threat. Rather, Pakistan should have allowed Kashmir to stay on the back-burner and strengthen its bonds with India, stabilising its own domestic politics and boosting its economy. Yet, 77 years on from Partition, Pakistan’s establishment remains wedded to the idea that India is a permanent enemy, resulting in a ‘Kashmir-first policy’, which means investing in Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear strength, and also support for groups that target India.

‘India is the only country that believes in both a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world’

Pande was dubious about the likelihood of India-Pakistan relations improving, as, from 1947 to 2015, 45 meetings between heads of state and dialogue have all failed. This points to deeper reasons for the antipathy, which need to be resolved. For its part, India will not resume dialogue with Pakistan until it addresses the issue of cross-border terrorism.  Also, Pakistan’s economic pressures would be eased if there was better trade with India, and indeed across the entire Subcontinent. Pande gave the example of ASEAN countries having strong trade links with each other, yet in South Asia this is less than 5%. She also spoke of how the ’India factor’ impinges on Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan, and how Pakistan has often supported various jihadi groups there, and hoped for a pro-Pakistan, anti-India Afghan government.  For Pakistan to improve, to provide more for its own citizens and not depend on the IMF again and again, Pande concluded that there needs to be a change in mindset in the deep state and military security establishment. Sadly, she did not see that changing any time in the near future

There needs to be a change in mindset in the deep state and military security establishment

Pakistan is an unusual country, said Dr Tahir Kamran, Professor of History at Beacon house National University, Lahore, in that its creation was not the outcome of a unified nationalist movement fuelled by a tangible impulse of nationalism, but rather it was driven by separatist tendencies of a Muslim elite from the minority provinces of British India, who sought political power and autonomy, rather than a broader nationalistic vision for the future of the Subcontinent.This lack of a coherent anti-colonial ideology is apparent in Pakistan’s independence movement, as seen in leaders such as Jinnah, who emphasised the protection of Muslim interests and made a Muslim identity central to the formation of Pakistan.That is how we can differentiate Pakistan from the rest of South Asia, added Kamran, as Jinnah did not identify their struggle in terms of a popular anti-colonial narrative. Rather, he emphasised the protection of Muslim political interest in a postcolonial India.The result was the establishmentof Pakistan as a neo-colonial and multinational state, not apostcolonial state.

Kamran also spoke of Pakistan’s difficulties in finding ways to deal with its deep Islamisation and extremism, Balochistan, etc, though he saw the new generation as, for example, wanting Pakistan to have good relations with its neighbours, though the real problem is how to keep a balance between India and China, and China and the United States. Re. the return of Trump to the White House, the Pakistan state will be under pressure, believed Kamran, due to the good relationship between Trump and Imran Khan, who enjoys a lot of public support. Indeed, one of the biggest problems is how to deal with Imran Khan, but Pakistan relies on the politics of military action. The Army must take a back seat and allow a proper political voice to be heard, and yet it does not seem to be in the mood to do this. If it did, Pakistan could be far more inclusive.

HARD CHOICES: Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharifhasbeenforcedtoimplementadraconianbudget

Dr Syed Mohammad Ali, Lecturer in Global Security Studies, Johns Hopkins; Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute, Washington DC, focused on how authoritarianism is a post-colonial phenomenon, which in the case of Pakistan has led to the emergence of the current hybrid regime. While he would not be an apologist for malgovernance in Pakistan, he insisted that we do have to look at the historical roots and broader geostrategic environment surrounding what Pakistan is now doing, eg dynastic rule in Bangladesh, ethno-majoritarian rule in India, and with Pakistan it is the miltary.  If we look at governance in colonies, added Ali, public servants are not supposed to be accountable to the people, but to lord over them. This has also happened in post-colonial Africa.

Ali also highlighted Pakistan’s position as an aid economy, which comes with strings attached, and drew attention to how geopolitical imperatives, and even global economic imperatives, have helped sustain top-down governance models within Pakistan.

The interconnection between politics and the economy that underpins Pakistan’s crisis was the focus for Yunas Samad, Professor of South Asian Studies and Associate Fellow, Political Science at LUMS, and Emeritus Professor at the University of Bradford. He noted that hybrid regimes, where real power rests with the army, rely on concessions such as tax breaks and subsidies to secure allies, which are politically costly to revoke and thus further exacerbate the country’s economic instability. He spoke of a crisis of regime type, manifesting in the political and eonomic spheres, and added that elections aren’t enough to make a democracy – Pakistan is an illiberal titulary hybrid regime, with the military an extremely powerful player that now giving diktats to the government. The defence ministry and intelligence agencies are populated by the military, who look to the Commander-in-Chief rather than the PM, and the military establishment has used the crisis in Balochistan and the tribal areas to undermine the authority of the civilian government, and increase its leverage.

Re. this connection with the economic crisis, Samad said that trade with India has been blocked by the Army, as it is not in its interest to seek improved trade with India, even though this could lead to 80% in exports. And while there may be an economic crisis in the country, there is not in the military, whose budget has increased. Development projects have also become politicised, eg to provide jobs in certain parties’ constituencies. So, we have a regime type that creates enormous strains on the economy, which is an example of military-civil elite capture, which allows the military to remain top dog. In the context of the Cold War and War on Terror, this worked, but this model has now been exhausted.

MJ Akbar is the author of several books, including Doolally Sahib and the Black Zamindar: Racism and Revenge in the British Raj, and Gandhi: A Life in Three Campaigns

To watch the full discussion, tune in to