The desire to get rid of the dollar has grown beyond mere academic debate. What used to be a minor topic of conversation among left-wing Latin Americans is now a major topic of debate at the SCO and BRICS, thanks in part to middle powers like India and China and Russia. 

Unlike China’s, which openly pushes for the yuan to become a new reserve currency, India’s strategy been nuanced and gradual. India has been quietly working on its regulatory framework for the rupee to become an international currency. The Special Rupee Vostro Account (SRVA) system, which was set up in 2022, is a pivot of this experiment. Foreign banks can hold rupees and settle trade directly with SRVAs, so they don’t have to change them to dollars first. Russia has fully accepted this mechanism. By the end of 2025, more than 90% of trade between India and Russia will be in rupees and rubles, instead of dollars or euros. Most of this trade is oil going east and pharmaceuticals or machinery going west. As Western sanctions have hurt Moscow, trading in rupees is a way for it to survive. It gives New Delhi both energy security and a way to cut down on its reliance on the dollar. More importantly, it helps exporters and banks learn how to keep a currency stable around the world by managing liquidity, settlement times, hedging exchange risk, and recycling surpluses into Indian bonds and stocks. 

The Reserve Bank of India has made it easier for non-residents to open rupee-denominated accounts abroad, allowed rupee trade credit facilities, and even thought about letting Indian banks lend rupees to people in other countries. Plans also include global infrastructure platforms like UPI (Unified Payments Interface) for use across borders. This means that India’s success in fintech at home will become a part of currency diplomacy.  

India is still being careful, though. Beijing wants to make the yuan more international, but New Delhi doesn’t yet say that the rupee should completely replace the dollar. Instead, its motto is ‘optional’: every trading partner should be able to deal with India in rupees. That way of thinking is less scary and pragmatic. 

India is also weighing options like using central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) for trade settlement. The Reserve Bank’s digital rupee pilot has grown to include wholesale cross-border transactions. There are already talks at the SCO about how to connect CBDCs to regional networks that can work together. 

This digital bet has two benefits for India: it can speed up settlement, avoid Western financial plumbing like SWIFT, and lower costs for small exporters. Digital settlement can also help ease the rupee’s liquidity problems by linking it to programmable smart contracts for trade credit and swap deals. New Delhi sees a chance to make the rupee a part of a digital-first trading bloc where the dollar is not the natural reference point. Russia, Iran, and even ASEAN partners have shown early interest in CBDC pilots. 

It would be naïve to think that de-dollarization is only a BRICS story. Even US allies in Asia, like Singapore, South Korea and Japan, are trying out different ways to protect themselves from too much exposure to the dollar. The Local Currency Settlement Framework has made it easier for businesses in ASEAN to send invoices in regional currencies like the rupiah, baht and ringgit. Japan and South Korea are starting to trade more in yen and won, especially since the dollar’s value changes a lot under different US presidents, making it harder to hedge. Singapore has set up its fintech ecosystem to support multi-currency settlement networks, making it a neutral hub in a payment system that is becoming more and more fragmented around the world. 

Africa isn’t far behind either. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) now lets people clear payments in local African currencies, almost right away. BRICS-backed banks like the New Development Bank (NDB) have also started lending money for big infrastructure projects outside of dollar channels. 

India has a long history of trading with Africa, so it sees potential here: rupee settlements can use PAPSS frameworks to offer a reliable, convertible but non-dollar option. Indian banks have already opened SRVAs with banks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana. 

The idea of a new BRICS reserve currency, called the ‘Unit’, is probably the most daring. In 2024, Russia released prototypes that were backed by gold to make them more trustworthy. There are mixed reactions to the plan. Beijing and Moscow see it as a direct attack on the dollar, while India is worried about giving too much power to a supranational instrument that China could control with its huge monetary power. 

Instead, India wants to strengthen parallel infrastructure, such as BRICS Clear, the in-house settlement platform; the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism for instant transfers; and insurance and reinsurance pools that are safe from Western sanctions. India’s fingerprints can be seen in these efforts: they are careful and gradual, but they are having a bigger and bigger impact on shaping the options instead of completely rejecting them. 

But geopolitics gives it a boost. As sanctions grow, the dollar becomes more and more weaponised, and Western institutions seem less and less concerned with the needs of the Global South, the case for ‘some alternative’ gets stronger. India is in a unique position to take advantage of this because it has credibility in both Western and non-Western groups. 

If all goes well, the 2030s could see not just one currency replacing the dollar, but a pluralist financial world. For example, the yuan could be used in parts of Asia, the rupee in South Asia and Africa, regional currencies in ASEAN, PAPSS in Africa, and maybe even a BRICS Unit to keep things stable. 

That once-idealistic vision is now the main idea that ties BRICS and SCO together. And India, with its nuanced approach, could not only be a player but also a quiet architect of the world after the dollar.